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Bihar refuses to shake off its image of a caste-ridden society among both academic 
scholars and popular observers. This preoccupation with caste continues to inform 
scholarly analyses of voting behaviour of its adult populace. It equally informs the 
analyses of post-Independence trajectory of its politics in terms of shifting intra-party 
factional alliances and the fluctuating social bases of political coalitions. Although the 
politics of lower caste empowerment has had a late start in Bihar when compared to 
states in southern and western India, the explanatory pre-eminence of caste as a 
framework for understanding political phenomena remains firmly etched in 
contemporary political sociology. Interestingly, its being the nerve centre of extreme 
forms of agrarian radicalism has not been able to overshadow caste-centric 
discussions and formulations that so easily stick to anything and everything that 
relates to politics in Bihar. Caste appears to be such a natural and legitimate way to 
imagine and experience the state in its various avatars, that it obviates the need for 
any scholarly investigation. The ingrained currency of the politics of lower-caste 
empowerment and the attendant celebration of the efflorescence of popular 
sovereignty and social justice adds to the taken-for-granted analytical prowess of 
caste.  
Caste has been hailed as a great facilitator of the twin processes of 
‘democratisation of politics’ and ‘consolidation of democracy’ and its role in helping 
bridge the gap between India’s social and political democracy has been underlined 
time and again (Jaffrelot 2003). An acknowledgement of democracy’s triumphant 
march pushes conventional concerns of good governance, rule of law and 
development to the back seat: ‘if increased political participation by historically 
marginalized groups is considered a measure of democratic legitimacy, however, then 
it is not necessarily the failings of democracy, but rather its increasing penetration that 
contributed to Bihar’s poor governance and economic decline over the last decade and 
a half’ (Witsoe 2006: 41). More often than not, the well-intentioned exaltation of the 
caste-based political empowerment ends up projecting caste as the only potent carrier 
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of an uninterrupted one-sided penetration of the democratic imaginary in the 
countryside. True, there is enough literature to suggest that in the process caste itself 
gets transformed and comes to acquire modern features much beyond its traditional 
purview of roles and functions (Kothari 1970a; Kothari 1970b). 
Recent ethnographic studies of state in India too reveal the intimate linkages 
between experiences of the state and that of caste. They enjoin us to be sensitive to 
the thickening nexus between state institutions, democratic practices, politico-
ideological discourses and informal cultural codes and the everyday social register 
that people employ in their interactions with the political (Fuller and Benei 2000). 
Following such a framework, I wish to particularise the democratic imaginary in the 
context of Bihar with a view to delineate its specific accretions. For this purpose, 
besides secondary literature, I draw upon fieldwork conducted in two phases 
(October-November 2007 and March-April 2010) in Sitamarhi, a district town in 
Bihar.1Can ‘primordial’ social categories like caste be invested with a self-propelling 
dynamics of its own, thus denying agency to countless men and women who engage 
in politics at the local level? One is aware that democratic politics have differential 
articulations in local contexts. One is equally aware that elements of social register 
too seep into democratic imaginary. After all, much of political sociology in 
contemporary times revolves around an understanding of the processes of 
‘politicisation of caste’ and its modernist role vis-à-vis the increasing scope and reach 
of democracy in India. 
 
Forward Castes and Backward Classes  
 
                                                          
1Sitamarhi lies on the western bank of the Lakhandai River in the fertile Middle Ganges Plain in 
northeastern India. It is a station on the East-Central Railways (earlier North Eastern Railway) and is 
connected by roads with the Nepal borders. It has been a commercial centre trading in rice, timber, 
oilseeds, and hides; it is part of the scared complex extending up to Janakpur in the Terai region of 
Nepal. Legend and religious beliefs portray it as the birth place of Sita (Ram’s consort) and it forms 
part of the cultural region called Mithila which shares an affinal relation with the Ayodhya region on 
this count.Our selection of Sitamarhi is guided by factors other than the present researcher’s 
preliminary exposure to the place. Sitamarhi has been the nerve-centre of Indian national movement 
and figures prominently in the context of Quit India movement of 1942 (see Yang 2000). Secondly, it 
is characterised by substantial presence of Muslims and has seen some of the worse communal rioting 
after Independence. The riots in the early 1990s have made Sitamarhi a part of the communally 
sensitive geographical locations in the country (see Varshney 2002). Moreover, it has been an active 
centre of socialist (backward classes) politics in the state.  
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If the political history of post-Independence Bihar were to be captured in two key 
words, they would definitely be Forward Castes and Backward Classes. One hardly 
comes across a work which does not draw upon this binary to make sense of much of 
politics in Bihar. As a rule, such studies would mention caste backgrounds of chief 
ministers, caste-wise distribution of ministerial berths, and the changing caste-
composition of the members of legislative assembly.Thus, a decline in the percentage 
of upper castes in the cabinet would be interpreted as their declining political power. 
Likewise, an increase in the percentage of a given caste (say Yadavs) in the 
Legislative Assembly would be considered as symptomatic of the political 
ascendancy of that caste. And since no caste can decide on its own the political 
fortunes at the state level, the relative ascendancy/decline of a political formation 
would be explained in terms of various permutations and combinations of the major 
caste groups (Blair 1972; Chaudhary and Shrikant 2001).  
Indeed, historical evidence suggests the viability of caste as a valuable 
political resource for modern politics in the state. Caste networks and associations 
were the channels through which political movements were launched and recast. The 
movement for the creation of a separate Bihar province in the colonial period is seen 
as the outcome of the organisational efforts of the Kayasthas. Like elsewhere, Bihar 
has had its fair share of caste associations and sabhas, the latter including for instance, 
Bihar Kayastha Provincial Sabha(1889), Bhumihar Brahman Sabha, All India Kurmi 
Mahasabha (1894), Gopajatiya Sabha (1909). Most of them were geared towards the 
organisation of cognate sub-castes and focused on a set of issues that combined the 
zeal for social reforms with efforts towards accessing public employment. 
In large measure, the fortunes and raison d’être of these sabhas were linked to 
the actions of the colonial state. For instance, Herbert Risley’s 1901 census was based 
on the idea of social precedence. The census-based classification of caste groups by 
rank gave rise to number of caste associations whose central agenda was to enhance 
their caste status by marshalling Sanskritic and ethnographic resources and petitioning 
the appropriate authorities. Bhumihars (Saraswati 1952) and Kayasthas (Carroll 1978) 
expended significant resources and energy in raising their respective caste statuses in 
subsequent enumerations, for they had been included in the Vaishya Varna in the 
1901 census. Likewise, Kurmis put in great efforts to ensure that their caste is 
removed from the list of criminal castes. It is during the interactions between caste 
sabhas and the colonial state that a new notion of social justice started taking initial 
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shape: (a) the responsibility to ensure justice to numerous caste groups within its 
domain rests with the state, and (b) it means devising appropriate ways and means so 
that public offices reflect caste-based proportionate representation to approximate 
respective share of different caste groups in the population. In this sense, the idea of 
caste-based proportional representation flowed from the strategies of colonial 
governance and has been implicated in the control of key public institutions ever 
since. The subsequent discourse on reservations for the Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) as embodied in the Mandal Commission recommendations is an elaboration 
and amplification of the very same idea of social justice. In the particular case of 
Bihar, as Roy (1968: 563) observes, ‘due to the absence of an infrastructure around 
which diverse interests can be organized, channelled and given autonomous roles, 
caste distinctions serve as a kind of comprehensive symbol for class and other criteria 
and are capable of becoming a politically potent force if reinforced by other factors 
such as a sense of political injustice’.  
Moreover, the presence of caste sabhas predates the establishment of Bihar 
Provincial Congress Committee in 1908. In other words, the politicisation of caste in 
Bihar precedes the advent of nationalist politics and has not been solely dependent on 
the latter for its articulation. This leads Frankel (1989: 64) to argue that ‘the fact that 
cognate castes and subcastes enlarged their identities through regional and provincial 
social organizations before the nationalist movement got underway, was an important 
factor in making this higher order of caste formation a potential unit of participation 
in politics’. It would not be too facile to argue that the nationalist political impulses 
reached the Bihar countryside through the preformed channels of a handful of caste 
groups. The caste character of Gandhi’s comrades-in-arms in the famous Champaran 
Sayagraha bears testimony to this narrow social base of nationalism in the early 
twentieth century Bihar (Pouchepadass 1999). Much later, even the JP movement 
amounted to a [not reqd]little more than another manifestation of caste group rivalry, 
involving a temporary alliance between leading politicians of the Backward Classes 
and their rivals among Bhumihar, Rajput and Kayashtha groups feeling excluded from 
the then Brahmin-led coalition(Shah 1977; Thakur  2000, 2010). 
It sounds plausible, though simplistic, that ‘the search for an enduring support 
base leads the contending groups to exploit the existing social distinctions and unities, 
which in Bihar primarily means the caste system. Inasmuch as caste distinctions 
represent primordial loyalty with an autonomous existence serving as a kind of 
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comprehensive symbol for class and other criteria, it becomes easier for the politician 
to exploit such distinctions for building a support base’(Roy 1966: 710). Nonetheless, 
caste identities have their own historicity; they are not to be seen as simply given. 
Yet, caste identities lend themselves as the most obvious way of categorizing citizens. 
The continual uses of these identities impart substance to the existing or manufactured 
caste unities and distinctions and thus helps fortify, maintain and perpetuate caste 
differences among voters in otherwise similar socio-economic circumstances. It does 
not matter so far as political uses of caste are concerned if caste differences 
coincide/diverge with other kinds of differences. No wonder, the usual narrative of the 
caste-politics relationship in Bihar turns out to be an unending tale of factional fights 
among high caste groups in the predominant congress system. These alliances and 
counter-alliances among the competing castes necessitate co-optation of men from 
‘politically inarticulate castes to positions of second rank leaders (who in due course 
emerged as leaders in their own rights), brought more and more castes into the vortex 
of politics’ (Roy 1968: 557).  
 Attempts at forging coalitional caste alliances and their successes and failures 
have been part of the same historical process. It is instructive to note that the first 
attempt to bring together Yadav, Kurmi and Koeri caste groups under the banner of 
the Triveni Sabha failed miserably. The same has been the fate of the Bihar State 
Backward Classes Federation that was founded in 1947 by freedom fighters belonging 
to the backward castes and communities. Frankel is right in asserting that ‘the caste 
associations of Bihar were never able to co-ordinate their efforts on behalf of Shudras 
as a whole. Competition for higher relative rank made political collaboration difficult 
notwithstanding periodic attempts to forge caste alliances on behalf of the Backward 
Classes’ (Frankel 1989: 65). To be sure, the larger unity of the Backward Classes 
tended to give way to the pressures of Sanskritisation that the individual low caste 
groups had to contend with given their relatively lower position in caste hierarchy. As 
against this, the high-caste groups were characterised by the relative cohesion and 
unity. Apart from factors such as high economic standing in terms of control of land, 
access to modern education, political awareness, the high caste groups were 
completely free from the burden of Sanskritisation, something that the low caste 
groups could ill-afford. As a consequence, their relative political trajectories differed 
in certain key respects in the first half of the last century. However, to the extent 
democratic politics had to act as the carrier of both social as well as political 
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aspirations, the broad identity forged on the social plane became available on the 
political plane: ‘the political system in Bihar has to discharge not only strictly 
political functions but social functions as well, thus in effect becoming an extension 
of the social system where the battle of upward social mobility is carried on’ (Roy 
1968: 557).  
 
Hierarchy Matters 
 
Some of the observers of the Indian caste system have argued that the increasing 
scope and growing reach of the democratic imaginary have made the hierarchical 
holism of the system give way to a loose confederation of discreet caste groups in 
perpetual competition for secular and material interests (Gupta 2000, 2005; Tanabe 
2007). ‘Natural repulsion’ and ‘ritual distance’ among caste groups have become 
almost insignificant. A close reading of Bihar politics does not lend itself to a 
corroboration of such a dismantling of the hierarchy. It is generally believed that the 
three upper castes (Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas) closed ranks in 1962 to 
support K. B. Sahay as the Chief Minister against Bir Chand Patel, a Kurmi leader 
supported by Maithil Brahmins led by Binodanand Jha. The fraternal wars between 
Bhumihars and Yadavs during the RJD rule (1990-2005) has had as much to do with 
secular interests as the former’s indignation at the rise of the latter as the ruling group. 
Likewise, development outcomes have usually flown through patron-client relations 
based on caste alliances which presuppose vertical linkages. The long-prevalent 
Brahminical ideology had historically imparted the upper castes a sense of their 
rightful privilege to rule. The latter’s enormous efforts to control democratic 
institutions can well be construed as surrogate to power and privilege that they have 
historically enjoyed in times of non-hegemonic Brahmanical ideology. Viewed thus, 
democratic politics becomes a mechanism for reproducing caste dominance and/or to 
challenge the existing dominance. Evidently, any understanding of dynamics and 
implications of democracy in Bihar has to engage with the ways in which electoral 
practices are embedded in local relations of dominance and subordination (Witsoe 
2009). 
 In a similar vein, democracy is seen as offering historically unavailable 
opportunities to lower castes to seriously undermine the hierarchical framing of the 
caste system. It is the democratic imaginary which makes it possible for them to think 
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of acquiring power in a legitimate fashion. Though, this realisation of their numerical 
preponderance as crucial electoral resource is hardly confined to the political field 
alone. In a village, the political, ritual and social have always been fused. As Witsoe 
(2011: 78) writes, ‘from the perspective of many lower caste villagers, the landlord 
historically has been in much closer proximity than state institutions but has also often 
enjoyed close relationships with state officials’. In other words, to control the state is 
to control the village and vice versa. In this reading, democracy gets imbued with an 
understanding of the larger relations of domination and subordination. Even when it 
remains a tool of political struggle its implications are almost always understood in 
caste terms. ‘For many lower caste villagers, electoral politics is not just about control 
of the state, but more crucially about control of the village and everyday power 
relations’ (Ibid 2006: 22). To the extent that caste constitutes the culture of 
exploitation at the village level, it is hardly surprising that democracy speaks the 
language that it speaks in Bihar (Chakravarti 2001). Logically then, ‘democracy is 
about the ways in which gaining control of the state can level inequalities in the social 
field’ (Witsoe 2011: 77-78). Indeed, that is where democracy’s radical potentiality 
lies. This is what explains the centrality of the struggle for control of the state by 
competing caste alliances. The discourse of political empowerment thereby turns out 
to be a discourse on the possible alteration of caste hierarchy.  
 Arguably, ‘struggles related to electoral practice can extend well within the 
boundaries of the official positions that are actually being fought over-a battle for a 
single parliamentary seat is translated into myriads of micro-struggles for village and 
regional dominance’ (Ibid. 2009: 66). As a consequence, intense social antagonisms 
come to characterise political processes and events in Bihar. Much of violence gets 
generated in the process which transgresses the usual bounds of democratically 
acquiring authority and legitimacy. In fact, a transformation of relations of agrarian 
production is so crucially dependent on this politics of caste empowerment that terms 
like ‘Dalit-Naxalite’ has come to acquire a kind of naturalness. This hyphenated 
identity connotes historicity and commonality of experiences such as landlessness, 
untouchability, oppression and poverty (Kunnath 2006). Since caste had been the 
idiom through which these experiences have been refracted, it is this caste 
consciousness which informs grassroots political agency which is based on a fusion of 
political consciousness with caste identity. 
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 Also, caste appears as the natural medium of interaction between civil society 
and political society a la Chatterjee (2008).The conceptions of democracy emerging 
from the political society are not mere distortions from the ideal. They are different 
and are differentially linked to the agency of political subjects who have been 
constituted differently. True, the prevailing democratic practices in the political 
society are far removed from the liberal notion of democracy whose ideal habitat 
happens to be the civil society. Yet, ‘it is precisely the “illiberal” character of 
democratic practice that makes possible a radicalization of democracy’ (Witsoe 2009: 
69). 
There is no denying that caste as an active and dynamic element in the cultural 
and political domain of the state has always been there notwithstanding changes in its 
forms and contents. As an identity marker it has intimately been interwoven with the 
unfolding of democratic imaginary over time. While there is palpable identification 
with the provincial/national leaders of their caste groups amongst local political 
workers, it would be premature to infer that the boundaries of the caste inevitably 
circumscribe their political universe. In any case, no particular caste group in a given 
parliamentary/assembly constituency can single-handedly decide the electoral 
outcome. The winning combination includes alliances between dominant castes and 
other caste groups. This translates at the local level in terms of socio-political 
camaraderie between local leaders representing different caste groups. Yet, these local 
equations among politically significant caste groups are never constant. The 
prevailing shifts in such equations reflect the overall political mood at the provincial 
level. 
For example, during my field-work (October-November 2007), I closely 
observed the mobilisational strategies for elections to the graduate constituency 
(Tirhut) of the Bihar Legislative Council. The ruling party (JD-U) had fielded a 
candidate belonging to the Brahmin Caste while the opposition RJD was supporting 
the incumbent Congress candidate who came from a prominent family of Bhumihar 
politicians. To my surprise, I found Bhumihar and Brahmin leaders working in unison 
to facilitate the victory of the JD-U candidate. This act gives a peep into their political 
understanding. The local leaders were of the view that the present ruling combination 
is the best that forward castes could ever hope for and it was their bounden duty not to 
unsettle the political applecart by displaying individual caste loyalties. They talked of 
the new social alliance of the upper castes, Kurmis and the extremely backward 
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classes, and they appeared determined to keep the alliance going lest the competing 
alliance of Yadavs, Muslims and the upper backward classes wrest political power 
from them. Clearly, caste loyalties are not the sole variable when it comes to elections 
and electoral support. What is interesting though is the uninhibited (at times innocent) 
use of caste idiom by one and all to explain shifting political combinations even when 
one knows that members of a given caste are distributed across the political spectrum, 
and any leader worth his name commands following in caste groups other than his 
own. A leader is acknowledged as a leader precisely because s/he is able to elicit 
support from a wide array of social groups crossing both caste and religious divides. I 
was fed with numerous stories of the committed Rajput and Muslim supporters of the 
local political heavyweight – RaghunathJha (a Maithil Brahmin). These supporters 
would always support Jhaji irrespective of latter’s switchover to the RJD. The leader’s 
current political affiliation does not matter as long as these supporters identify with 
the persona of a given leader. The acute awareness of the limitations of caste politics, 
and the continuing employment of caste framework and idioms to make sense of 
political arithmetic, is one of the interesting puzzles crying out for interpretive 
understanding so far as caste-politics relation is concerned. 
 
Patronage to Brokerage  
 
There is a general consensus among the observers of grassroots politics that the 
political empowerment through socialist politics of the post-independence era has 
changed the social character of political leadership in Bihar as elsewhere. With the 
burden of Sanskritisation being a thing of the past, caste identities of the middle rungs 
of the earlier caste hierarchy have come on their own, and the electoral politics has 
further reinforced this tendency. As Hauser (1997: 49) notes, ‘the transition from the 
late 19th and early 20th century politics of culture, in fact began with the Council and 
Assembly elections of the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless it is true that the political 
and social alliances which were to emerge full-blown in an environment of universal 
adult suffrage after 1947 were already apparent in the cultural and colonial electoral 
experience of the 1920s and 1930s’. Even otherwise, the image of a democratically 
elected state based on the promises of nation- building, development, and rule of law 
had few takers in the political society. The state was experienced through networks of 
patronage that reinforced upper caste dominance effectively undermining the 
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promises of a casteless society. By contrast, the politics of caste empowerment has 
brought into being alternate networks of lower-caste politicians and political brokers 
to rein in the upper caste dominance (Gupta 1997). 
Not surprisingly, political brokerage has come to be a new dispenser of social 
prestige. If a local leader can command compliance from the lower level state 
functionaries, his reputation would go up in local esteem. What is worth noticing is 
the smooth manner in which sources of social esteem have shifted to the modern 
democratic state. It appears that there is no questioning of the legitimacy of the 
modern democratic state; that is seen as fait accompli. One gets tempted to 
corroborate Micheluti’s (2008) celebration of the indigenization of democracy based 
on her ethnographic evidence from neighbouring Uttar Pradesh where yadavs tend to 
see themselves as a natural caste of politicians and Lord Krishna is held to be the 
originator of democracy. Most of the contestations are either to capture the levers of 
state power or work their way through them for purposes of individual and sectional 
gains. 
This also appears to have reworked the bases of social stratification in the 
local society. For long, government jobs have been replacing caste and land as 
sources of social esteem and prestige. In the course of the Indian National Movement, 
and in the euphoria that surrounded Indian Independence, ‘freedom fighters’ came to 
be accorded extraordinary prestige irrespective of their caste origins and economic 
status. One’s participation in a movement, the sacrifices that one had made, and the 
ideals one had followed, enhanced the person’s reputation. Such persons would be the 
chief guests at school functions, Independence and Republic Day celebrations, or any 
such associational activity that periodically sprung up in small towns like Sitamarhi. 
With the fading of the Indian National Movement from the public memory on account 
of temporal distance, and the natural disappearance of the freedom fighters, the new 
sources of prestige and privileges emanate from one’s perceived mastery and control 
over the state apparatus at whatever level. The centrality of the state power is so 
ingrained that much of the struggles around it acquire the aura of a Dharma-Yudha. 
Some of the local activists would get beaten up; would die while making crude bombs 
during election time; would get into endless litigation and persistent family feuds 
because of their apparent political proclivities. However, I have not come across any 
sense of remorse or repentance on the part of those who had to suffer. It is their 
politics albeit understood in terms of caste morality, loyalty to their caste leaders, or 
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the leader of the right type of alliance that propelled their political passion. Also, I 
could not see the pervasive sense of looking at politics as a dirty game that Ruud 
(2004) describes in his ethnography of West Bengal. In Bihar, politics is more of an 
adventure and less of an enterprise (Thakur 2009). 
Yet, it is impossible to make sense of this adventure without any reference to 
caste. Caste has had its own ways of creeping into the political system and public 
institutions. If a particular caste is seen as politically emergent and dominant, that has 
immediate impact on the local level political brokers. During the RJD rule in Bihar, 
most of the political middlemen at the block level would be either from the Yadav 
caste or from the caste groups seen to be part of the broader social coalition 
represented by the RJD. The change of government in Patna has palpable effect in the 
caste character of men with ‘towel over their armpit’. This trickle-down effect has 
afflicted the class-based political parties as well. For example, Yadavs have never 
been supporters of the Communist Party in Sitamarhi district. However, the perceived 
political ascendancy of the Yadavs in the early 1990s ensured that a Yadav is made 
the district secretary of the CPI. This reveals another aspect of caste dynamics at the 
local level – once a particular caste becomes politically dominant, most other political 
parties start projecting the leaders of the same caste among their ranks. And, this 
process did not even leave the Communist Party unaffected. Bihar offers a curious 
case where during the 15-year long rule of the RJD, many communist leaders defected 
to the caste-based parties. Reportedly, some of the local leaders of the communist 
parties tacitly worked for the RJD during elections even when the state leadership did 
not have form a political alliance with the latter. Thus, years of ideological 
indoctrination in class politics got wiped off at the altar of caste arithmetic. 
Undoubtedly, caste continues to influence social and political experience of 
the large number of citizenry in Bihar. It does not matter if the leadership roles are in 
the hands of LalooYadav or Nitish Kumar. As long as caste offers the kernel for the 
formation of a political subjectivity and the associated democratic imaginary, the 
unending debate over the relative merits of identity politics and good governance is 
not going to be of much help to understand the direction of political change. Likewise, 
the much talked about contradictions within the OBCs and/or the OBCs and Dalits are 
not going to make a dent in the caste-based democratic imaginary. The announcement 
of 20 per cent reservations for the EBCs (Annexure I castes) in Panchayat elections by 
the JD (U)-BJP government, and the entire official discourse around ‘Mahadalits’, are 
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the logical moments in the caste-based understanding of the democratic citizenship. 
Commenting on the Provincial Council elections of late 1926 and the Legislative 
Assembly elections of early 1937 in Bihar, Swami Sahajanand Saraswati writes, 
‘there is very little difference between nationalism and casteism, and it is a difference 
which disappears at a certain stage.... The only real difference is that caste covers a 
relatively smaller field whereas nationalism functions in a wider arena’ (cited in 
Hauser 1997: 49). And, this historical process has continued with effects which could 
not have been foreseen earlier. Political empowerment of the OBCs in Bihar is part of 
the same process. Though, it would be premature to write an obituary to the 
hierarchical social structure of caste based on an exaggerated reading of the salutary 
effects of the second democratic upsurge of the low caste groups. Even now the land 
ownership patterns display old patterns of dominance as it is mostly upper caste 
landowners who lease out land to mostly lower caste marginal and small cultivators 
(World Bank 2006). This is not to make light of the fact that other socio-cultural co-
ordinates of the caste-based exploitative relations have definitely been eroded thanks 
to the extensive politicization of caste. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What E P Thompson wrote about the process of working class formation in the 
nineteenth century England rings true for contemporary Bihar. To him, class was an 
historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected 
events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. It was his 
emphasis on its historicity that made him see class neither as a “structure”, nor even 
as a “category”. Class was something which in fact happens and can be shown to have 
happened in human relationships. One has to just replace class with caste to gain the 
understanding that caste (despite Louis Dumont) has never been a static ahistorical 
structure. Instead, it is best seen as a dynamic, whereby caste is always in a process of 
becoming, based not just on being (what one is) but on consciousness (what one 
perceives oneself as being). And this consciousness is always guided by politics and 
leads to the shaping and reshaping of political subjectivity in concrete historical 
settings. 
In Bihar, the continual caste-based mobilisations have contributed to this 
shaping of modern political subjectivity in unanticipated ways. Democratic co-
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ordinates of modern politics are as legitimate to the erstwhile beneficiaries of the 
hegemonic Brahmanical ideology as they are to its erstwhile victims. Modern state 
power is sought as much by those whose privileges could not be supported by the 
caste ideology of the yore as by those who wish to create a new ideological hegemony 
around the twin ideas of political representation and social justice. The makers of the 
caste-based culture of exploitation as well as the challengers to such iniquitous 
relations of dominance and sub-ordination have equally taken to the virtues of 
democratic politics in an unparalleled fashion. It is this immense faith in the 
emancipatory potential of democracy which makes it possible for a poor low-caste 
villager to cast his vote in Sitamarhi to see his leader acquiring power in Patna. And, 
his is not merely a primordial act of caste loyalty for he has come to see the 
unforeseen connections between the workings of power and dominance in his village, 
(his block and his district) and the social character of ministers and MLAs and MPs 
and bureaucrats who decide on issues of larger importance in the capital. This 
demystification of the everyday workings of power would not have been possible 
without the expansive reach of the democratic imaginary through whatever route it 
has taken.  
Such an understanding privileges the way modern democracy is experienced 
substantively in its myriad manifestations by groups constituted differently than many 
standard assumptions about liberal notions of democracy would have us believe. 
Without discounting democracy’s normative content, this paper underlines the need to 
document its varied cultural histories not only to critique and problematise its 
universal pretensions but also to entertain the possibility of democracies. All said and 
done, democracy does need the support of the exegetical prowess of its bright and 
ingenious theorists; it needs the services of ethnographers no less. It would be 
foolhardy to dispense with the meticulous ethnographic interrogation of democracy’s 
actual practices. And, to that extent, we can celebrate the increasing critical 
anthropological engagements with democracy. 
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